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Unilateral Mistake of Fact in Personal
Injury Releases
Paul D. Malina*

M

that appear on court calendars,
as well as many not filed, are settled before trial. Settlements usually involve payment by the alleged wrongdoer in consideration of a release executed by the injured party. As for the
alleged wrongdoer, this act settles the conflict in that the releasor
has bargained away his legal remedy. As for the releasor, compensation for the injury was his objective.
Sparse authority to the contrary,1 a release constitutes a
contract, the validity of which can be affected by fraud, duress
or mistake. 2 Generally, one need not go into equity and pray for
specific relief from the release on one or more of these grounds.3
The majority of jurisdictions permit the injured party to bring
his action, notwithstanding the previous release of all claims. By
way of replication to the defense of release, the injured party
sets up his contention for avoidance. It is thereby possible, under
this procedure, to avoid the release and bring the suit in one
action at law.
ANY PERSONAL INJURY CASES

The Mistake as Contemplated by the Law
The Restatement defines a mistake as being a state of mind
not in accord with the facts. 4 Another source proposes that it is
an act or omission made under an erroneous conviction of fact,
which would not have been made or omitted, but for the erroneous conviction. 5 It has also been treated as the effect of
erroneous ideas upon legal acts.6 It seems that the authorities,
notwithstanding a variance of expression, require a concurrence
of an act and a state of mind, the former being inconsistent with
the latter, in order for the mistake to produce legal consequences.
* B.S. in Bus. Admin., Ohio State Univ.; Third-year student at ClevelandMarshall Law School.
1 45 Am. Jur. Release § 2 (1943).
2 45 id. § 17.
3 5 Williston, Contracts § 1551 (rev. ed. 1937).
4 Restatement, Contracts § 500 (1932).
5 Black, Law Dictionary 1453 (4th ed. 1951).
6 5 Williston, supra, n. 3, § 1535.
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This view necessarily excludes the propriety of an act or decision
from the legal meaning of mistake. Thus the individual, who
intentionally releases another from liability for all known or
unknown injuries, has made a very real mistake, in the common
use of the word, if subsequently, serious injuries are discovered.
But, this would not be a mistake within the legal meaning, since
the act and state of mind were consistent. On the other hand, an
intention to release another from liability for only known injuries, while the actual execution of the instrument embraced
both known and unknown injuries, would be a mistake within
the above definitions. However, other circumstances, which will
be discussed below, would need be present in order to gain relief
from the mistake.
When the mistake of fact is solely that of one party to the
contract, it is termed unilateral. 7 Carrying this to its logical conclusion, the truest form of a unilateral mistake of fact exists
when the non-mistaken party knows of the other's error.8 Unilateral mistake, however, is not exclusively confined to this particular circumstance. It has been extended to cases when the
non-mistaken party is not aware of the other's mistake. While
ignorance of this error will cause the non-mistaken party to labor
under an erroneous idea as to the other's state of mind, nevertheless this is a unilateral mistake in that the error as to state
of mind is considered irrelevant. 9 Rarely will relief be afforded
for this second type of unilateral mistake.
Unilateral Mistake, Generally
In the application of mistake of fact as a means for avoiding
a contract, the rule is likely to be cited for the broad proposition
that the mistake must be mutual in order to justify relief. 10 It is
T 43 Words & Phrases 243 (perm. ed.).
8 5 Williston, supra, n. 3, § 1570A.
9 Ibid.
10 Automobile Underwriters v. Smith, 126 Ind. App. 332, 133 N. E. 2d 72

(1956); Doyle v. Teasdale, 263 Wis. 328, 57 N. W. 2d 381 (1953); Thomas
v. Hollowell, 20 Iii. App. 2d 827, 155 N. E. 2d 827 (1959); Jordan v. Brady
Transfer & Storage, 226 Iowa 137, 284 N. W. 73 (1939); Hanson v. Northern
States Power Co., 198 Minn. 24, 268 N. W. 642 (1936); Cheek v. Southern
R. Co., 214 N. C. 152, 198 S. E. 626 (1938); Diltz v. Sherrick, 108 Ohio App.
188, 161 N. E. 2d 93 (1958); Federoff v. Union Collieries, 141 Pa. Super. 308,
15 A. 2d 385 (1940); John J. Bowes Co. v. Town of Milton, 255 Mass. 228,
151 N. E. 116 (1926); Sheeran v. Irvin, 230 Ky. 307, 19 S. W. 2d 976 (1929);
Hello World Broadcasting Corp. v. International Broadcasting Corp., 186
(Continued on next page)
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frequently contended that to hold otherwise would seriously disturb the stability achieved by the objective theory of mutual
assent. While, undoubtedly, this is the general rule, it is well
settled, in the law of contracts, that avoidance will be allowed
for "true" unilateral mistake (when one knows of the other's
mistake) .11 The relief granted in this instance is not inconsistent
with the objective theory. While it is the outward manifestation
of assent that is controlling under this theory, it is confined to the
manifestation that falls upon a reasonable mind, and not merely

any mind.
As it does in non-release cases, the granting of relief for a
"true" unilateral mistake applies equally to a release of a personal injury claim. Mistakes within this area fall into two major
categories-namely, mistake as to the nature of the instrument

executed or the claim covered, and mistake as to the injuries
sustained.
(Continued from preceding page)
La. 589, 173 So. 115 (1937); Green v. Bankers Life Ins. Co. of Nebraska, 112
Kan. 50, 209 P. 670 (1922); Gross v. Stone, 173 Md. 653, 197 A. 137 (1938);
James v. Tarpley, 209 Ga. 421, 73 S. E. 2d 188 (1952); Seigle v. HamiltonCarhartt Cotton Mills, 89 Okla. 68, 213 P. 305 (1922).
11 Galloway v. Russ, 175 Ark. 659, 300 S. W. 390 (1927): the plaintiff mistakenly believed he was purchasing a Frigidaire machine from a representative of the Frigidaire Company. The defendant knew of this mistake,
but did not inform the plaintiff that he represented another company and
that the subject of the contract was not a Frigidaire machine. The contract
was set aside. In Nelson v. Pedersen, 305 Ill. 606, 137 N. E. 486 (1922), a
contract for the purchase of a parcel of land was cancelled where the
vendor knew that the purchaser believed he was buying a lot other than
that described in the contract, but remained silent. In Frederich v. Union
Electric Light & Power Co., 336 Mo. 1038, 82 S. W. 2d 79 (1935), it was held
that the plaintiff was entitled to cancellation when, in an offer to buy an
easement to flood land at a specific price, more than 90% of the land
intended to be included was mistakenly omitted, so that the vendor must
have recognized that the offer involved a mistake. In Davis v. Reisinger,
120 App. Div. 766, 105 N. Y. Supp. 603 (1907), the plaintiff was refused
damages for the defendant's breach of a contract to deliver rice when the
plaintiff knew that the defendant mistakenly sold a superior grade at prices
of inferior grades. In Parker v. Title & Trust Co., 233 F. 2d 505 (9th Cir.
1956), a cancellation of title policies was allowed when the insured knew
the title to the property was not good, but remained silent. In M. F.
Kemper Coast. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 37 Cal. 2d 696, 235 P. 2d 7
(1951), relief was allowed for mistaken bid of a material character where
the board accepted it with knowledge of the mistake.
See also, Freeman v. Croom, 172 N. C. 524, 90 S. E. 523 (1916); Fransen
v. State, 59 S. D. 432, 240 N. W. 503 (1932); C. H. Young Co. v. Springer,
113 Minn. 382, 129 N. W. 773 (1911); Wilson v. Wyoming Cattle & Invest.
Co., 129 Iowa 16, 105 N. W. 338 (1905); Hudson Structural Steel Co. v.
Smith & R. Co., 110 Me. 123, 85 A. 384 (1912); Crosby v. Andrews, 61 Fla.
554, 55 So. 57 (1911); Bell v. Carroll, 212 Ky. 231, 278 S. W. 541 (1925).
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Unilateral Mistake Respecting the Instrument Executed or Claim
Covered
Cases arise in which the releasor signs a general release (all
known or unknown, foreseen or unforeseen bodily or personal injuries, and the consequences thereof resulting from the accident),
although he is in fact mistaken as to what the instrument purports
to be. These circumstances appeared in Palkovitz v. American
Sheet and Tin Plate Company.12 The plaintiff executed a release
of personal injury claims against his employer, mistakenly believing it to be a receipt for relief money. His mistake was not
shared by the releasee, who knew, or should have known of the
mistake, inasmuch as the terms of the instrument were explained
inadequately by an interpreter, the releasor being ignorant of
the English language. Avoidance of the release was allowed in
this case.
The Palkovitz case's illustrates the fact pattern of a releasee
who knew or should have known of the mistake, but who remained silent. In cases when the releasee causes the mistake by
an intentional misrepresentation of fact, a strong circumstance
for avoidance exists. Any contention that the releasee knew
nothing of the mistake would obviously fail. Avoidance was
allowed in a Washington case 14 when the releasee caused the
mistake by representing the release to be a receipt for money
received. The releasor could not read, write, speak or understand the English language.
The Excuse for the Failure to Read
The releasor is confronted with another problem aside from
that of showing that his mistake was known or should have been
known by the defendant. Generally, the cases in which the mistake went to the nature of the instrument, were the result of
not reading the release upon its execution. The releasor must,
therefore, produce an excuse for this omission, since it is well
settled that one may not be heard to complain of signing a paper
which he did not read. In Heckenkamp v. Kennedy, 15 the plaintiff executed a release, mistakenly believing that it covered only
12

266 Pa. 176, 109 A. 789 (1920).

13 Ibid.
14 Mattson v. Eureka Cedar Lumber & Shingle Co., 79 Wash. 266, 140 P.
377 (1914).
15 267 F. 2d 887 (8th Cir. 1959), applying Missouri law. Accord, Bennett v.
Himmelberger-Harrison Lumber Co., 116 Mo. App. 699, 94 S. W. 808 (1906);

(Continued on next page)
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damages presently sustained and not future damages. There was
evidence that the defendant knew of the mistake, inasmuch as
he had misrepresented the contents of the release to the plaintiff.
However, no avoidance was allowed since the plaintiff could
read and had no excuse for the failure to do so.
Illiteracy is one of the two most common excuses for the
failure to read. In Miller v. Spokane Int'l Ry.,' 6 the plaintiff, a
servant of the defendant, was seriously injured as a result of a
fall from a moving train. Being ignorant of the English language,
he executed a general release of claims under the belief that it
was a receipt for wages. In consideration of this release, the
defendant paid him $138.00. His illiteracy constituted a valid
excuse for not reading the instrument, and he was awarded
$7500.00 by the jury upon avoidance of the release.
The second of the two common excuses is a weakened condition resulting from the injuries sustained. These cases exemplify the courts' disdain for the hasty release of claims, notwithstanding the general view that settlements of disputes by
compromise are favored. 17 In an Iowa case,18 the releasor was
(Continued from preceding page)
Texas & P. R. Co. v. Poe, 131 Tex. 337, 115 S. W. 2d 591 (1938). But see,
St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Smith, 82 Ark. 105, 100 S. W. 884 (1907);
Joseph v. Tata, 161 N. E. 2d 763 (Sup. Ct. Mass. 1959). See also, Crawley v.
Studebaker Corp., 183 Mich. 462, 149 N. W. 1019 (1914).
16 82 Wash. 170, 143 P. 981 (1914). Illiteracy was a valid excuse in the following cases: Palkovitz v. American Sheet & Tin Plate Co., 266 Pa. 176,
109 A. 789 (1920); Heuter v. Coastal Air Lines, 12 N. J. Super. 490, 79 A.
2d 880 (1951); Mattson v. Eureka Cedar Lumber & Shingle Co., 79 Wash.
266, 140 P. 377 (1914); Scott v. Bodnar, 52 N. J. Super. 439, 145 A. 2d 643
(1958); Meyer v. Haas, 126 Cal. 560, 58 P. 1042 (1899); Robles v. Preciado,
52 Ariz. 113, 79 P. 2d 504 (1938); Mairo v. Yellow Cab Co., 208 Cal. 350,
281 P. 66 (1929); Gimmarro v. Kansas City, 342 Mo. 428, 116 S. W. 2d 11
(1937); Markowitz v. Metropolitan Street R. Co., 32 Misc. 751, 65 N. Y. S.
784 (1900); Perry v. M. O'Neil & Co., 78 Ohio St. 200, 85 N. E. 41 (1908);
Davis v. Whatley, 175 So. 423 (La. App. 1937).
17 Kowalke v. Milwaukee Electric R. & Light, 103 Wis. 472, 79 N. W. 762
(1899); Borden v. Sandy River & R. L. R., 110 Me. 327, 86 A. 242 (1913).
18 Platt v. American Cement Plaster Company, 169 Iowa 330, 151 N. W. 403
(1915). A weakened condition resulting from the injuries was a valid excuse in the following cases; Baltimore & 0. R. Co. v. Morgan, 35 App. D. C.
195 (1910); Whitmarsh v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 61 F. Supp. 850 (D. C.
Pa. 1945); Shaw v. Victoria, 314 Mass. 262, 50 N. E. 2d 27 (1943); Union
P. R. Co. v. Harris, 63 F. 800 (8th Cir. 1894), aff'd., 158 U. S. 326, 15 Sup.
Ct. 843 (1895); Smith v. Occidental & 0. S. S. Co., 99 Cal. 462, 34 P. 84
(1893); Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Lewis, 109 Ill. 120 (1884); Bliss v.
New York C. & H. R. R. Co., 160 Mass. 447, 36 N. E. 65 (1894); Connors v.
Richards, 230 Mass. 436, 119 N. E. 831 (1918); McCall v. Toxaway Tanning
Co., 152 N. C. 648, 68 S. E. 136 (1910); Leonard v. Hare, 325 S. W. 2d 197
(Civ. App. Tex. 1959). See also, Albarello v. Meier, 159 N. Y. S. 2d 761
(City Ct. N. Y. C. 1957).
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in a serious condition at the time he executed the release. Due
to this condition he was unable to read the release and believed
that it was a receipt for back wages. His weakened condition
was a valid excuse for not reading the paper, and avoidance was
allowed.
Other circumstances have been recognized by the courts as
constituting a valid excuse for the failure to read the release. It
was a valid excuse for the inability to read when the room in
which the release was executed was so poorly lighted that reading was not possible; 19 or when the releasor was unable to read
due to the fact he did not have his glasses with him and could
not see without them;2 0 or when the releasor was justified in
relying upon the misrepresentations of his attorney that the
instrument covered only back wages and tips; 21 or when the
releasor, while in a state of grief, was called from the funeral
parlor for the purpose of executing a release of a wrongful death
22
claim for the death of his child.
The Presence of Other Persons When the Release is Executed
It is essential that the releasor have no means at hand for
ascertaining the contents of the instrument. If there are persons
present, aside from the defendant or his agent, the releasor must
call upon them to read the release to him. In Anderson v. Meyer
Bros. Drug Company,23 the plaintiff was unable to read the release, due to the effects of her injuries. However, her resulting
mistake provided no ground for avoidance since her mother was
present at the time the release was executed and could have read
it to her if requested to do so.
Similarly, it has been held that a release could not be
avoided when an injured servant, unable to read due to defective eyesight, could have called upon his relatives, who were
present at the time the release was executed; 24 or when the reRobertson v. George A. Fuller Construction Co., 115 Mo. App. 456, 92
S. W. 130 (1905).
20 Green v. St. Louis-San Francisco R. Co., 224 Mo. App. 517, 30 S. W. 2d
784 (1930). Accord, Whitehead v. Montgomery Ward, 194 Ore. 106, 239 P.
2d 226 (1951).
21 Ricketts v. Pennsylvania Railroad, 153 F. 2d 757 (2d Cir. 1946), 164
A. L. R. 402 (1946).
22 Jordan v. Guerra, 23 Cal. 2d 469, 144 P. 2d 349 (1943).
23 149 Mo. App. 554, 130 S. W. 829 (1910).
24 Hall v. Kansas City S. R. Co., 209 S. W. 582 (Kansas City Ct. App. 1919).
19
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leasor did not have his glasses, but his wife could have read the
25
paper.
Unilateral Mistake as to the Instrument, Summarized
The "first glance" impression that a unilateral mistake of
fact will not be relieved is overcome by a study of the cases.
The courts have relieved mistaken releasors from their contracts,
and there is no indication that they will not continue to do so.
When the facts disclose a unilateral mistake that was known,
or should have been known by the releasee, coupled with the
releasor's excuse for not reading the release, a sound case for
avoidance exists. In Heuter v. Coastal Air Lines, 26 an excellent
summary of the law was set forth by the court:
To avoid the release he could properly rely upon the evidence of his illiteracy, his illness, the absence of friends and
counsel, his lack of understanding and the omission of all
explanation, the haste, pressure and somewhat startling
circumstances surrounding the procurement of his mark,
and invoke pertinent equitable principles based upon unfair
and unconscionable conduct of the defendant.
Unilateral Mistake Respecting the Nature and Extent of the
Injury
The fact that serious personal injuries are not always immediately apparent to the injured party, or even to the trained
physician, seems to account for the enormous volume of litigation involving a mistake as to the injury sustained. Basically,
the cases present a similar fact pattern in which a release is
obtained from a releasor who is mistaken, either as to the nature
of his injuries or as to the extent of the injuries he has sustained.
But the cases present a variety of judicial reasonings.
If both the releasor and releasee were ignorant of the serious
nature of the injuries sustained by the releasor, the ground for
avoidance would be mutual mistake. 27 If the releasor's mistake
was caused by an innocent misrepresentation of the releasee or
his agent, a common mistake would exist and the ground for
avoidance would again be mutual mistake,28 or constructive
Higgins v. American Car Co., 324 Mo. 189, 22 S. W. 2d 1043 (1929).
12 N. J. Super. 490, 79 A. 2d 880 (1951).
27 Atlantic Greyhound Lines v. Metz, 70 F. 2d 166 (4th Cir. 1934).
generally, 71 A. L. R. 2d at 90.
28 McCarthy v. Eddings, 109 Colo. 526, 127 P. 2d 883 (1942).
25

26
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fraud 9 If the releasor was mistaken and the releasee knew or
should have known of the mistake, the ground for avoidance
would be unilateral mistake.
The fact pattern of "true" unilateral mistake, for which
avoidance will be allowed, arises in two ways. In the first, the
releasee knows or should know of the releasor's mistake, but
remains silent. In Nadeau v. Maryland Casualty Company,3 0 the
plaintiff sought out the defendant's adjuster for the purpose of
securing an advance on an accident policy. Although refusing
the advance, the adjuster offered to settle the claim in full. The
plaintiff accepted the offer and settled his claim for $673.65, but
did so under a mistaken belief as to the serious nature of his
injuries as described in the doctor's report. The adjuster was
a man of fourteen years' experience in his field, and knew or
should have known from the language of the doctor's report, that
the plaintiff's injuries were serious. The release was no bar to
the plaintiff's action.
The second situation, in which "true" unilateral mistake
arises, is the result of the releasee causing the mistake by an
intentional misrepresentation of the releasor's condition. The
cases speak in terms of fraud under these circumstances, although the fact pattern is typical of "true" unilateral error. In
view of the great number of non-release as well as release cases,
in which knowledge of the mistake gives rise to avoidance,3 1 it
would seem that the fact that the mistake was known by the
releasee would be sufficient, irrespective of the circumstance by
which the knowledge was obtained. Avoidance was allowed in
3 2
when it appeared that the
Avery v. Eddy Paper Corporation,
plaintiff's mistake was caused by the intentional misrepresentations of the defendant's doctor, although the court spoke in terms
of fraud.
29 Estes v. Magee, 62 Idaho 82, 109 P. 2d 631 (1940).

170 Minn. 326, 212 N. W. 595 (1927). Accord, Sullivan v. Elgin, J. & E. R.
Co., 331 Ill. App. 613, 73 N. E. 2d 632 (1947); Janney v. Virginian Railway
Company, 119 W. Va. 249, 193 S. E. 187 (1937) (it was said a mistake known
to releasee would justify relief); Humphrey v. Erie Railroad, 116 F. Supp.
660 (D. C. N. Y. 1953); Graham v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 176 F. 2d
819 (9th Cir. 1949); Kansas City Southern R. Co. v. Martin, 262 F. 241 (5th
Cir. 1920). See also, Backus v. Sessions, 17 Cal. 2d 380, 110 P. 2d 51 (1941);
Gambrel v. Duensing, 127 Cal. App. 593, 16 P. 2d 284 (1932). But see,
Thomas v. Hollowell, 20 I1. App. 2d 288, 155 N. E. 2d 827 (1959).
31 Cases cited supra ns. 11 and 30.
32 295 Mich. 277, 294 N. W. 679 (1940).
30
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Are Additional Elements Necessary for Avoidance?
The releasor, mistaken as to the instrument, needed an excuse for his failure to read the paper. But the majority of cases
in which the mistake went to the injury do not seem to require
more than "true" unilateral error. When the plaintiff's mistake
was caused by the intentional misrepresentation of the defendant's doctor, the cases clearly hold that avoidance will be allowed.3 3 The plaintiff is not required to consult his own physician or obtain independent advice.
A few cases have charged the releasor with ascertaining his
condition by directly consulting the doctor (either the defendant's or his own physician) when the representation was made
by the defendant's claim agent. This distinction between a misrepresentation made by the defendant's doctor, as opposed to one
made by the defendant's claim agent, was drawn by a Missouri
case. 34 The defendant's agent, in that case, told the plaintiff
that the doctor had said that the plaintiff would be able to return
to work within four months. The plaintiff executed a release,
believing this to be a true statement of his condition. The court
refused to relieve the plaintiff from his contract upon the reasoning that he could have contacted the doctor in order to determine
the veracity of the agent's statement.
Similarly, in Hetrick v. Yellow Cab Company, 5 avoidance
was denied the plaintiff. But, the plaintiff was seeing her physician every day while the release was being negotiated, and
could have inquired of him whether or not the defendant's adjuster had made a truthful statement concerning her condition.
The facts in this case might well support the conclusion that the
plaintiff was not in fact mistaken as to her physical condition,
and perhaps this may have influenced the court in its decision.
However, the majority of the authorities have not picked
up the reasoning of the Conklin6 and Hetrick37 cases. No more
33 In the following cases the defendant's doctor intentionally caused the
plaintiff's mistake by misrepresenting his true physical condition and
avoidance was allowed: Tattershall v. Yellow Cab Co., 225 Mo. App. 611,
37 S. W. 2d 659 (1931); Munnis v. Northern Hotel Co., 237 Ill. App. 50
(1925); Lion Oil Refining Co. v. Albritton, 21 F. 2d 280 (8th Cir. 1927);
Matthews v. Atchinson T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 54 Cal. App. 2d 549, 129 P. 2d
435 (1942); Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Treece, 188 Ark. 68, 64 S. W. 2d 561
(1933), cert. den. 292 U. S. 626, 54 Sup. Ct. 630.
34 Conklin v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 331 Mo. 734, 55 S. W. 2d 306 (1932).
35 167 Wash. 135, 8 P. 2d 992 (1932).
36 Supra, n. 36.
37 Supra, n. 37.
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is required of a releasor when his mistake was caused by a misrepresentation of the defendant's claims agent than would be
required of him when the mistake was caused by the defendant's
doctor. 38 The mere showing of "true" unilateral error is sufficient. As stated by a Minnesota court:
In any event, although in Minnesota the mistake need not
be mutual in the sense that both parties are under a similar
delusion, there must be concealment or at least knowledge
on the part of one party that the other party is laboring under a mistake in order to set aside a release for unilateral
39
mistake.
In the following cases the defendant's agent intentionally caused the
plaintiff's mistake by misrepresenting his true physical condition and
avoidance was allowed: Stewart v. Steinoff, 119 S. W. 2d 76 (Mo. App.
1938); Frazier v. Sims Motor Transport Lines, Inc., 196 F. 2d 914 (7th Cir.
1952); Kennedy v. Raby, 174 Okla. 332, 50 P. 2d 716 (1935); Baumann v.
Hutchinson, 124 Neb. 188, 245 N. W. 596 (1932); Capital Traction Co. v.
Sneed, 26 F. 2d 296, 58 App. D. C. 141 (1928), cert. den. 278 U. S. 604, 49
Sup. Ct. 10; Southern R. Co. v. Nichols, 135 Ga. 11, 68 S. E. 789 (1910);
Peoples Cent. Transit Lines, Inc. v. Myers, 267 Ky. 277, 102 S. W. 2d 21
(1937); Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Callahan, 127 F. 2d 32 (10th Cir. 1942).
See also, Ciletti v. Union Pac. R. Co., 196 F. 2d 50 (2d Cir. 1952), (applying
Nebraska law).
39 Keller v. Wolf, 239 Minn. 397, 58 N. W. 2d 851 (1953).
38
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